The Constitution of Space and Time in the Aufbau Viewed from a Kantian Perspective by Kaneko, Yusuke
19
1 1   Introduction
Michael Friedman (1987, pp.89f.) famously defended the Aufbau 2 against 
Quine’s criticism (1950, p.40), saying that Carnap’s strategy had more affinity 
with Kantianism (Friedman 1987, p.98) 3. Indeed, Carnap showed a strong 
empathy to Kant’s philosophy:
(1)4  By categories, we mean the forms of synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
into the unity of an object. [… The] manifold of intuition is called “the given” in 
[our] constitution theory […]. […And t]he synthesis of the manifold into the 
unity of an object is[, in our theory,] regarded as “the constitution of an object 
from the given” (Carnap 1928, §83).
“Categories,” “synthesis,” and “the manifold”－ these terms of Kant’s were 
inherited by Carnap as well. Meanwhile, he attempted even modernization of 
Kant’s philosophy, according to Friedman:
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The foremost aim of this paper is to realize the fourth part of 
the Aufbau. This part, which provides an actual phenomenalistic 
constitution system, is interpretable from a Kantian perspective 
(§§1-4). But Carnap plotted to overcome Kant’s old style of phi-
losophy as well. We review this aspect of his constitution, focus-
ing on space (§§7-13) and time (§§5-6), especially.
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(2) [Carnap’s] project is not strictly Kantian […]. For Kant himself, merely 
formal logic is quite inadequate for the constitution of objectivity, and we need 
to supplement it with a “transcendental logic” that makes essential reference to 
intuition: the “pure intuitions” of space and time. Now, in the context of the 
much more powerful conception of formal logic bequeathed to him by Frege and 
Russel, Carnap finds such an independent appeal to the “forms of intuition” 
quite unnecessary […] (Friedman 1987, pp.98-99).
The bequest of Frege and Russel made Carnap think Kant’s framework of space 
and time unnecessary. 
Did Carnap succeed in this strategy? Hereafter, we review Carnap’s course of 
thought exclusively from this perspective 5. This inquiry provides, on the one 
hand, a systematic study 6 of the Aufbau Friedman never attempted. On the 
other hand, it leads to a new perspective filling the gap between a traditional 
philosophy once completed by Kant and a modern analytic philosophy opened 
up by Carnap.
I strongly hope this study is read by researchers of Kant as well, since herein 
could be a modernization or formalization of Kant’s epistemology. The central 
figure carrying it out henceforward is nobody but Carnap. Did he fail or succeed? 
I want readers to make sure of it by themselves. 
Carnap’s strategy was, as far as this article is concerned, to abstract the 
Kantian notion of space and time from our personal, primitive experiences, 
using his original concept of similarity. By doing so, he thought, the Kantian 
“pure intuitions” of space and time could be removed. But as we shall see, 
Carnap never succeeded in it: Kant’s notion of space and time must be 
presupposed even in his formalization, because without the notion, the 
elementary experiences are never provided (§6, §13). Was, then, Carnap’s 
attempt in the Aufbau completely frustrated? No. It still remains a great precursor 
and role model of a modernization of traditional epistemology. And I myself 
think it could be applied to the explication of analyticity as well if we improve 
the disputable concept of similarity (§14).
2   The Manifold
Now, let us embark on the modernization of Kant’s epistemology. What we take 
as such was adequately stated in the preceding citation (=(1)). Kant dealt with 
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it, notoriously, in naïve psychological terms, according to which the manifold is 
integrated into a unity of an object, and then recognition is formed from the 
unity (cf. Kant 1787, B137). 
Carnap’s formalization of Kant’s theory began with the clarification of this 
naïve terminology, so to speak. First, he worked on that of a typically Kantian 
term, the manifold 7.
Köhler & Wertheimer’s Gestalt theory and Schlick’s analysis seem to have 
influenced him at that time. As a result, he reached the following view:
(3) [The given] are the personal experiences 8 themselves in their totality and 
closed unity (Carnap 1928, §67).
That is, the manifold is personal (private) and never decomposed into atoms. 
Carnap put this notion of the manifold at the bottom of his system, calling it 
an autopsychological basis 9.
3   Egocentricity
By taking the manifold as a basis, however, Carnap once broke with Kant 
(Carnap 1928, §§64-65). It is because, in so doing, his picture became fully 
subjective. Then, how on earth can our recognition be objective? This question 
eventually brought him back to a Kantian picture, which provided him the 
distinctive notion of form/content (Carnap 1928, §66). Hereby, the subjectivity 
of the manifold was attributed to its content alone, to which the form was 
applied successively. This is how the manifold turned objective.
Additionally Carnap introduced the core of Kant’s theory, the transcendental 
apperception 10, as the bearer of the form. It was stated by Kant with a Cartesian 
twist in the following way:
(4) “I think” must be capable of accompanying all representations of mine (Kant 
1787, B131-132).
Carnap favored this picture, calling it egocentricity 11.
4   The Recollection of Similarity
The universal ego gives a form to private experiences. The form is nothing but 
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what Carnap called “category” above (cf. (1)). But what exactly is the form? 
Carnap adopted only one thing as such: the recollection of similarity 12. With 
the manifold (the content) newly named elementary experiences 13, now the basis 
of his system was decided:
(5) Phenomenalistic constitution system 14
(i) Basic relation 15 : the recollection of similarity, i.e., Er(x,y) (or xEry)16.
(ii) Basic element 17 : elementary experiences, i.e., erl={x1, x2,…}.
The more fundamental of the two was the recollection of similarity; elementary 
experiences were no more than the elements of its field 18, i.e., erl=fldEr.
5   The Constitution of Time
Now we came to the starting point of the Aufbau. From this basis, other objects 
are constituted 19. In the constitution, we deal with that of space and of time 
above all.
As for time, however, Carnap constituted it with the basic relation, Er, alone. 
The ground for it was that he thought Er to parallel the order of time. He says:
(6) When [we recall x and find it similar to y], the memory image of the earlier, 
i.e., x, must be compared with y. Therefore, this recognition process is not 
symmetric; the way x appears when we compare it with y is different from that 
when we compare y with x conversely (Carnap 1928, §78).
The recognition of similarity is not symmetric, not reversible. In this respect, it 
resembles the course of time. It should be noted that the time in question is 
our inner state of time. Precisely here, Kant’s theory steps into our picture:
(7) [T]ime decides the relationship of representations in our inner states (Kant 
1787, B50).
But did this parallelism work so well? It seems difficult at first sight, because 
temporal order is fundamentally linear 20, i.e., transitive 21 and trichotomous 22.
Similarity lacks, in the first place, transitivity. Suppose Tom and Mike are 
similar, and so are Mike and John. Yet it is not always the case that Tom and 
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John are similar 23. But regarding this defect, Carnap provided a relief measure, 
the power relation 24 symbolized as Erpo. Its definition is as follows.
(8) 25 Er1(x,y)←→ def.Er(x,y)
Er2(x,y)←→ def.׌z1[Er1(x,z1)ǘEr(z1,y)]←→׌z1[Er(x,z1)ǘEr(z1,y)]
Er3(x,y)←→ def.׌z2[Er2(x,z2)ǘEr(z2,y)]←→׌z2[׌z1{Er1(x,z1)ǘEr(z1,z2)}ǘEr(z2,y)]
…Ern＋1(x,y)←→ def.׌zn[Ern(x,zn)ǘEr(zn,y)]
Here Erk＋1 is defined so that it complements the lack of transitivity (of Erk). 
Carnap added extensions further to these; that is, Er1=def.{<x,y>|Er(x,y)}
26, 
Er2=def.{<x,y>|Er
2(x,y)} etc. Lastly, these extensions are connected into a 
union: Er0ǕEr1Ǖ…ǕErn=Ǖȹni=0 Eri. This union is called a chain 27 with the symbol 
Erpo. 
Erpo is the attribute of this class: Erpo={<x,y>|Erpo(x,y)}. It is certainly 
t r a n s i t i v e i n  d i s t i n c t i o n f ro m E r ;  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  To m E r p oM i ke 
(<Tom,Mike>אEr1ؿErpo) and MikeErpoJohn (<Mike, John>אEr1ؿErpo), then 
TomErpoJohn (<Tom, John>אEr2ؿErpo).
This is how Carnap followed up the lack of transitivity. But another defect 
remained. Trichotomy did not hold even of Erpo. There could be a pair, xi and xj, 
of which none of xiErpoxj, xi=xj, and xjErpoxi holds; simply put, they could be not 
similar at all. Nevertheless, Carnap optimistically expected that this defect 
would be overcome as his constitution develops (1928, §120)28.
6   Goodman’s criticism
This is the constitution of time by Carnap. Probably, the author can make any 
excuse for the technical defect of this kind. Was the constitution then 
successfully made? Nelson Goodman, who wrote the best commentary (1951, 
V), objected:  
(9) [I]t is questionable whether [Carnap’s arguments on the recollection of 
similarity] make possible a satisfactory constitution of temporal order […]. 
Carnap’s argument […] would seem to assume [against his will] that memory 
images and afterimages [which are temporally specified in advance] are 
epistemologically as fundamental as [the recollection of similarity] (Goodman 
1951, p.132).
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“[M]emory images and afterimages” 29 mean the same thing: past experiences. 
Regarding them, Goodman insists: to recognize the past experiences as such, 
i.e., to specify them in time, we need more than the recollection of similarity.
This makes sense, practically. Consider the case where we recognize a 
similarity between two past experiences. How exactly could we know one is 
temporally precedent to the other? It is impossible unless we specify them in 
time in advance. For this very reason, we cannot but say Carnap’s argument is 
quite unsatisfactory.   
7   The Other Point at Issue: Space
This is how Carnap’s theory of time is criticized. It did not supersede Kant’s 
theory, either 30. Then, what about space? Let us continue our inquiry.
Space is concerned with our visual field in particular. Hence we need more 
detailed information of the manifold. But unfortunately, it is not found in the 
Aufbau (cf. Kleinknecht 1980, p.23 note1). Nevertheless, by reference to other 
researches (cf. Leitgeb 2007, p.190, Goodman 1951, p.141), we can provide it:
(10) Now I see a red spot in the upper left place of my visual field and a blue 
spot in the lower right place. 
This is an example of the manifold. How is space constituted from this coarse, 
raw experience? This is our concern below. 
8   Color Spot
For the discussion, let us first segment the preceding example: 
(11) <now, <red, the upper left>, <blue, the lower left>>
Although these expressions are merely for simplicity, it is quite interesting that 
these ordered pairs 31 show a similar structure to protocol sentences 32.
In this formulation, we realize that an elementary experience consists of two 
parts: specification of time like “now,” and a color spot like “<red, the upper 
left>.” The color spot is so important in the following discussion, which was 
introduced by Goodman 33 and defined as a pair of a color like “red” and a place 
like “the upper left.” Clearly, this latter factor is concerned with our present 
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interest: space.
Our experience could have different color spots at one time like “<red, the 
upper left>” and “<blue, the lower left>” in (11)34. So the elementary 
experience is fundamentally a colorfully spotted plane (two-dimensional visual 
field).
We are largely indebted to Goodman for this interpretation (1951, p.141). 
Following him, we can arrange elementary experiences in the following way:
 
(12)35
Here, to each color-spot, e.g., “<red, the upper left>,” one alphabet, e.g., “a” 
is assigned. And “xi” stands for one elementary experience, on the right side of 
which its content is shown like “ah.” 
9   Similarity Circle
However, the most outstanding above is surely the balloons. They stand for the 
similarity circles based on Ae 36. This is an abstraction concept in Carnap’s 
system 37 and defined as follows:
(13)38  ähnli is a similarity circle 
39
←→ def. ׊x׊y[((xאähnliǘyאähnli)→xAey)ǘ((xאähnliǘyבähnli)→¬(xAey))]
This formula says, “In a similarity circle, every element is similar to any of the 
other members.” Take another look at (12). Certainly, in one balloon, every 
element is similar to any of the other members. But what exactly does it mean? 
What is “similarity” in the first place?
In (13) just stated, Ae stands for part similarity 40, which is reduced to Er:
x1)  ah  x4)  bl  x7)  chp  x1 0)  dlt  x1 3)  ep  x1 6)  f tw
x2)  ai x5)  bm x8)  ciq  x11)  dmu x1 4)  eq  x1 7)  fu
x3)  aij x6)  bmn x9)  ciqr  x1 2)  dmuw x1 5)  eqr  x1 8)  fuw
x1 9)  afim
ähnl1
ähnl2
ähnl4
ähnl3
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(14) For any x and y, xAey ←→ def.
 xEry ש yErx ש x=y (Carnap 1928, §110)41 
But there is room to discuss the notion of Er further. Actually, Er is definable 
here in a stricter manner than before (§5):
(15) For any x and y, xEry ←→ def. at least one alphabet of x is adjacent to at 
least one alphabet of y (cf. Goodman 1951, p.127)42.
See, e.g., ähnl1 (cf. (13)). Certainly, x1Erx3 holds since a in x1 is the same as 
(thus, adjacent to) a in x3 ; again, x1Erx9 holds since h in x1 is adjacent to i in x9. 
This is how we realize every element is similar to any of the other members in 
a similarity circle.
10   Quality Class
The constitution of space is made by abstracting places from the similarity 
circles. But places are still inside color spots, which consist of elementary 
experiences in similarity circles. So next, we must take color spots out of 
similarity circles, and then, abstract the places.
As we see in (13), each color spot is already arranged neatly. For example, 
{x4, x5, x6} brings b into relief. Interestingly enough, these arrangements 
occupy vertical spaces alone, where similarity circles overlap each other. Carnap 
called them essential overlaps 43 (cf. Goodman 1951, pp.134f.).
Thus, if we can take out essential overlaps, it soon leads to the abstraction of 
color spots. On this procedure, Carnap had two obstacles in mind 44. One is the 
case where a class not fitting into the vertical space is wrongly chosen. For 
example, {x19, x5, x6, x11, x12} is possibly chosen to abstract m. However, in the 
present situation, it is not favorable. 
The other is the case where a subclass of an essential overlap is wrongly 
chosen. For example, {x17, x18} is possibly chosen to abstract u. But in the 
present situation, it is not favorable.
To avoid the first obstacle, Carnap laid down the following regulation.
(16)45 ׊·[{(· is a similarity circle)ǘ׌x(xאȽǘxא·)}→ (Ƚؿ·)]
“Ƚ” stands for “a quality class for one color spot,” which we call a color-spot 
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class hereafter (cf. Goodman 1951, p.140). Now, (16) says, “If some members of 
Ƚ belong to a similarity circle, Ƚ as a whole must be included in the circle.” By 
this regulation, {x19, x5, x6, x11, x12} is excluded. Take this class as Ƚ; x19אähnl1, 
but {x19, x5, x6, x11, x12}مähnl1.
To avoid the second obstacle, Carnap laid down the following regulation:
(17)46 ׊x[(xבȽ)→׌Έ{(Έ is a similarity circle)ǘ(ȽؿΈ)ǘ(xבΈ)}]
Roughly speaking, this means: “For any x outside Ƚ, there must be a bigger 
circle (=Έ) to which x does not belong, either.” By this regulation, {x17, x18} is 
excluded. Take this class as Ƚ; x16ב{x17, x18}, but there is no similarity circle 
which {x17, x18} is wholly included in, and x16 does not belong to. 
By these regulations, the abstraction of color spots seems to be made 
smoothly. But practically, the first regulation (=(16)) was too strong.
Have a look at x19 in (12). Although this is not illustrated, ähnl1 and ähnl4 
overlap at x19. In other words, a member (=x19) of {x1, x2, x3, x19}, which is a 
subset ofähnl1 and promising for the abstraction of a, belongs to ähnl4 as well. 
But {x1, x2, x3, x19} is not wholly included in ähnl4. So it violates regulation (16).
Carnap called this kind of accident an accidental overlap 47 (cf. Goodman 1951, 
pp.134f.). To keep {x1, x2, x3, x19} promising for a, he then turned his eyes to the 
number of the members belonging to a similarity circle. As for {x1, x2, x3, x19}, 
the number of its members belonging to ähnl4 is only one (=x19), while that 
belonging to ähnl1 is all of the four. Distinguishing these two cases, Carnap laid 
down the bar of half, through which the accidental overlap is avoided. With this 
modification, the color-spot class is defined as follows:
(18) (Ƚ is a color-spot class) 
←→ def.  ׊·[{(· is a similarity circle)ǘ( |΅ǖ·|―|΅| > 1―2 )}→ (Ƚؿ·)]ǘ׊x[(xבȽ)→׌Έ{(Έ is 
a similarity circle)ǘ(ȽؿΈ)ǘ(xבΈ)}] 48 (Carnap 1928, §112).
The first conjunct on the right side (=“׊·…”) is the modified version of (16), 
and the second (=“׊x…”) is the same as (17). Hereafter, we symbolize the 
class of all color-spot classes, i.e., {Ƚ1, …, Ƚn}, as qual 49. 
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11   Similarity between color-spot classes
Now then, suppose that we obtain some color-spot classes, Ƚ1, Ƚ2, …, from (18). 
The next step is to partition them into “similar” groups. For this purpose, we 
must define the “similarity” concept between color-spot classes in advance:
(19) For any Ƚi and Ƚj, ȽiAqȽj ←→ def. ׊x׊y[(xאȽiǘyאȽj)→xAey] 50
Definiendem Aq is the similarity between color-spot classes 51. Taking Def. (14) of 
Ae into account, simply this formula reduces Aq to Er, which was defined 
earlier (=(15)). But oddly enough, Carnap introduced a new similarity concept 
here again:
(20)52 Let x be <t1, <c1, p1>>, and y be <t2, <c2, p2>> 
53. Then, xAey ←→ def. 
[(c1 is similar to c2)ǘ(p1=p2)] ש [(c1=c2)ǘ(p1 is near (similar to) p2)]. 
Although incompatible with previous arguments, this new concept of similarity 
actually work very well, which properly partitions qual, i.e. {Ƚ1, …, Ƚn}, into 
equivalence classes: 
(21)54 Make a power relation of Aq, i.e., Aqpo, which becomes an equivalent 
relation as well 55. Thereby, we can partition qual into {{Ƚ1, …}, {Ƚ2, …},…}, 
that is, {{Ƚi|Ƚ1AqpoȽi}, {Ƚj|Ƚ2AqpoȽj},…} 56. This latter class is called a partition 
of qual modulo Aqpo (a quotient set of qual modulo Aqpo), symbolized as qual/Aqpo 
or {[Ƚi]Aqpo|Ƚi אqual} 57.
12   The Visual Field Place
Each member of this class, [Ƚi]Aqpo (אqual/Aqpo), is called an equivalence class 58. 
Let us then take one, [Ƚ1]Aqpo) (={Ƚ1, Ƚ3, …}={Ƚi|Ƚ1AqpoȽi})59, numbering its 
members all over again: {Ƚ11, Ƚ12,…} (={Ƚ1, Ƚ3, …}). Its content is, taking (19) 
and (20) into account, supposed to be as follows (Given that the class is 
composed of only four elemenets):
(22) Ƚ11=the color-spot class for <red, the upper left>
  Ƚ12=the color-spot class for <pink, the upper left>
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  Ƚ13=the color-spot class for <orange, the upper left>
  Ƚ14=the color-spot class for <red, the left>
Here, Ƚ11AqȽ12 holds, because any member of Ƚ11, which has the form <t, <red, 
the upper left>, …>, is similar (from Def. (20)) to any member of Ƚ12, which 
has the form <t, <pink, the upper left>, …>, so that Ƚ11 and Ƚ12 are taken to 
belong to the same equivalence class, [Ƚ1]Aqpo, in accordance with (21).
How can we then take the spatial place “the upper left” out of this class? 
This is the final stage of our abstraction. Carnap focused on a certain feature 
here:
(23) Two color-spot classes indicating the same spatial place cannot have any 
elements in common 60.
For example, Ƚ11, Ƚ12, and Ƚ13 above cannot have any elements (elementary 
experiences) in common, because they refer to the same place, “the upper 
left.”
This could be realized if we admit one place, even if referred to by different 
experiences, cannot have different colors. Surely it can if we admit a certain 
length of time in the experiences. But Carnap excluded such cases by adding a 
proviso “at the same time” 61 to (23)62.
Thus, to abstract the spatial place, we should partition {Ƚ11, Ƚ12, Ƚ13, Ƚ14} into 
subclasses the members of which do not have any elements in common. We 
introduce the following relationship to carry it out:
(24)63 For any Ƚi, Ƚj אqual/Aqpo, ȽiFreȽj ←→ def. Ƚi=Ƚj ש ¬׌x[xאȽiǘxאȽj]
Using this Fre, we can partition qual/Aqpo into the following k’s:
(25) k is a certain subclass of an equivalence class in qual/Aqpo the members of 
which do not have any elements in common ←→ def. For any Ƚi and Ƚj אqual/
Aqpo, [((ȽiאkǘȽjאk)→ȽiFreȽj)ǘ ((ȽiאkרȽjבk)→¬(ȽiFreȽj))].
Compare this with (13) above. As is soon realized, k is taken a similarity circle 
based on Fre. And we symbolize the class of all k’s as Sim‘Fre (Carnap 1928, 
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§117). This k is much the same as the spatial places sought for. The following 
definition becomes a finish:
(26)64 P is a place ←→ def. ׌Ƚi(ȽiאP)ǘ׌k(kאSim‘Fre)ǘP=(k－Ǖ(Sim‘Fre－{k}))
A concrete example may help to understand this definition:
(27) x1=<t 
65, <red, the upper left>>
  x2=<t, <red, the upper left>, <green, the lower right>>
  x3=<t, <red, the upper left>, <blue, the center>>
  x4=<t, <pink, the upper left>>
  x5=<t, <pink, the upper left>, <black, the just lower part>>
  x6=<t, <orange, the upper left>>
  x7=<t, <orange, the upper left>, <green, the just upper part>>
  x8=<t, <red, the left>>
  x9=<t, <red, the left>, <pink, the upper left>>
  x10=<t, <red, the left>, <red the upper left>>
Following the preceding notation (§8), x1 can be symbolized as “b,” x2 as “bi,” x3 
as “bm,” x4 as “c,” x5 as “cu,” x6 as “d,” x7 as “dw,” x8 as “a,” x9 as “ac,” x10 as 
“ab.” These are, in accordance with (13) and (15), put into one similarity circle, 
while the color spot <red, the upper left> is common among x1 to x3 and x10, 
<pink, the upper left> among x4, x5 and x9, <orange, the upper left> between 
x6 and x7, <red, the left> among x8 to x10, respectively. Suppose that these 
groups are located in the essential overlaps (cf. §8). Then, color-spot classes 
corresponding to (22) above are constituted.
(28) Ƚ11={x1, x2, x3, x10}, Ƚ12={x4, x5, x9}, Ƚ13={x6, x7}, Ƚ14={x8, x9, x10}
The preceding definitions, (25) and (26), are understandable from this instance. 
First, recall that {Ƚ11, Ƚ12, Ƚ13, Ƚ14} forms an equivalence class. That is, {Ƚ11, Ƚ12, 
Ƚ13, Ƚ14}={Ƚi|Ƚ1AqpoȽi}אqual/Aqpo. Then, we can constitute “the similarity 
circles based on Fre” in accordance with (25):
(29) k1={Ƚ11, Ƚ12, Ƚ13}, k2={Ƚ13, Ƚ14}
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For a finish, the spatial places are constituted in accordance with (26):
(30) Sim‘Fre={k1, k2}
 (i) Let k1 be k in (25). Then, Ǖ(Sim‘Fre－{k1}=Ǖ{k2}=k266. Therefore,
   k1－Ǖ(Sim‘Fre－{k1})=k1－k2={Ƚ11, Ƚ12, Ƚ13}－{Ƚ13, Ƚ14}={Ƚ11, Ƚ12}67=P.
 (ii)  Likewise, when k2 is k in (25) instead, {Ƚ14}=P.
In the case of (i), the place “the upper left” is abstracted. In the case of (ii), the 
place “the left” is abstracted. Each of them is called a visual field place 68, which 
is nothing but the spatial place we have sought for.
13   Evaluation
This is how space was constituted in the Aufbau. Let us then ask: Could it 
supersede Kant’s picture? Kant’s picture here means the following:
(31)  Through external senses, we represent objects as outside of us and in 
space. It is in the space that we recognize the form of the objects [as far as they 
appear to us], their size [as far as they appear to us], and their mutual relations 
[as far as they appear to us] (Kant 1787, B37).
In this passage, Kant defines space not as something like a coordinate, but as a 
fundamental framework for our recognition of external objects. It implies that 
even initial recognition of spatial locations, such as “right,” “left,” “upper,” 
“lower,” “in front of,” and “behind,” is unfeasible without that framework 69. 
It is true that Carnap succeeded in the abstraction of space. But it never 
follows that Kant’s framework of space is no longer necessary. The fact is the 
opposite. Kant’s framework is indispensable even for the Aufbau. For see the 
original example of the elementary experience (=(10)); therein, the spatial 
locations, “the upper left” and “the lower right,” are inscribed in an inerasable 
manner, which means: the spatial location is indispensable even for the 
elementary experience, since otherwise we would be lost in regard to where 
each color is. For this reason, we should say, the Aufbau never superseded 
Kant’s philosophy; it still needs the latter framework.
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14   Conclusion
We have seen Carnap’s course of argument in the Aufbau from a Kantian 
perspective. After all, it never superseded Kant’s picture. This does not mean, 
however, Carnap’s theory was useless. Its significance remains. At the cutting 
edge, Hans Leitgeb (2007, 2011) has worked on its revival.
As for me, I think the Aufbau is more suitable to explicate analyticity. 
Analyticity cohesively concerns the concept of the objects, which is also the 
specialty of the constitution theory, as we have seen so far. 
While details are left to another paper, there remains a few parts to be 
corrected in Carnap’s theory. In particular, its central notion, similarity, is still 
unclear. As much as three characterizations of it are presented heretofore; that 
is, (7), (15), and (20). We will not be able to apply the theory of the Aufbau to 
the explication of analyticity until this ambiguity is removed.
Notes
 1.  Each section is referred to with the symbol “§.” But “§” also stands for “section” 
of the Aufbau, for example.
 2.  As for the abbreviation of titles, see REFERENCES.
 3.  Pincock’s survey (2009) is informative for the overview.
 4.  The translation of German texts (of Carnap’s and of Kant’s) is arbitrarily made 
by the author.
 5.  However, we do not deal with the relationship of our argument to modern phys-
ics like Einstein’s relativity theory. 
 6.  Hans Leitgeb (2007, 2011) is one of the researchers who develop the technical 
aspect of the Aufbau. But his study is not concerned with Kant’s philosophy.
 7.  “Das Mannigfaltige” (Carnap 1928, §83).
 8.  “Die Erlebnisse” (Carnap 1928, §64).
 9.  “Eine eigenpsychische Basis” (Carnap 1928, §§63－64).
10.  “Transzendentales Subjekt” (Carnap 1928, §66).
11.  “Ich-Bezogenheit” (Carnap 1928, §65).
12.  “Die Ähnlichkeitserinnerung” (Carnap 1928, §66).
13.  “Elementarerlebnis” (Carnap 1928, §66).
14.  A constitution system is a system according to which almost all the objects are 
“constituted” (cf. note19) from more basic ones. We could imagine many systems 
of that kind, but they are theoretically unified into the constitution theory, which 
33
The Constitution of Space and Time in the Aufbau Viewed from a Kantian Perspective
Carnap elaborated on in the first half of the Aufbau (Carnap 1928, §§25－26).
15.  Grundbeziehung” (Carnap 1928, §61, §78).
16.  Relations are symbolized as xRy or as R(x,y) depending on contexts.
17.  “Grundelement” (Carnap 1928, §61, §67).
18.  “Das Feld” (Carnap 1928, §34). Carnap symbolized it as “C‘Er” (1928, §109, §34) 
in accordance with Principia (Whitehead&Russel 1910, p.35). In any case, C‘Er=fl
dEr=domEr׫ranEr={x|׌y(xEry)ש׌z(zErx)} (cf. Enderton 1960, p.40).
19.  Constitution is to define a less basic (so abstract) object from more basic ones by 
the constitutional definition (Carnap 1928, §35). The constitutional definition has 
two kinds. One is the explicit definition. The other is the definition in use or the 
contextual definition (Carnap 1928, §§38－40, Whitehead & Russel 1910, p.25, p.69). 
All the definitions below are the definitions in use, because they define the objects 
in the context of a biconditional sentence as a whole.
20.  See Sugihara’s analysis, for example (1974, pp.38f.). It is naturally true of Kant’s 
theory (Sakai 1978, p.64, Kant 1787, B46). As for the notion of linear ordering, see 
Enderton’s explanation (1977, p.170).
21.  For any t1, t2, and t3, if t1طt2 and t2طt3, then t1طt3. (“tiطtj” stands for “ti is tempo-
rally prior to tj.”)
22.  For any t1 and t2, exactly one of the following three holds: t1طt2, t1=t2, or t2طt1.
23.  This feature (intransitivity) was stated by Carnap in his logical definition of simi-
larity (Carnap 1928, §11). But there, in contrast with Er, symmetricity and reflexivity 
were admitted.
24.  “Potenzrelation” (Carnap 1928, §34). This concept is attributable to Principia 
(Whitehead & Russel 1910, pp.35－36).
25.  We use logistic notation a bit sloppily. For example, “׊” is sometimes replaced 
with “for any…,” and often omitted in the case of definition especially. Again, we 
do not observe the distinction between the object and the meta-language, the 
application of Quine’s quasi-quotes, and so on.
26.  Carnap distinguished Beziehung from Relation (1928, §28, §34). The latter is the 
extension of the former. He symbolized the former as Er, for example, and the lat-
ter as Er (Carnap 1928, §109). Then, Er={<x,y>|Er(x,y)}.
27.  “Eine Kette” (Carnap, 1928, §34).
28.  Carnap called trichotomy “Zusammenhang” (1928, §11). 
29.  Goodman sometimes says “a memory image or afterimage” (1951, p.132).
30.  Not supporting the Kantian view, actually Leitgeb (2011, p.280) adopted the 
temporal order as a primitive term in his “Aufbau-like” system.
31.  Carnap defined the sensation (die Empfindung) in a similar manner (1928, §93, 
§116), but it is a pair of an elementary experience and a quality class or color-spot 
(cf. Goodman 1951, p.145).
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32.  “Protokollsätze” (Carnap 1932, p.438).
33.  Goodman’s notation is “color-spot” (1951, p.134). Carnap generally called it a 
quality class (1928, §81).
34.  Although there are naturally far more color spots in reality, we ignore this point 
in the present discussion.
35.  This figure is made from Goodman’s rough arrangement (1951, p.135).
36.  “Die Ähnlichkeitskreise in bezug auf Ae” (Carnap 1928, §80, §111).
37.  Russel’s principle of abstraction (1937, §210) is one of its predecessors (Carnap 
1928, §97), which is originally an application of the partition into equivalence classes 
in set theory (cf. Enderton 1977, pp.55f., Leitgeb 2007, p.181). On the other hand, 
Carnap (1928, §§69－73) called this method quasianalysis (Quasianalyse), because 
abstracting a quality from an elementary experience is contradictory to his doctrine 
of totality (cf. (3)). Whether this self-criticism is taken seriously or not, most re-
searchers later challenged this part exclusively. Among them were Goodman’s 
famous companionship difficulty (1951, p.123) and difficulty of imperfect community 
(1951, p.125). Since this criticism, most researchers customarily have dealt with 
Goodman’s argument (Kleinknecht 1980, Leitgeb 2007; 2011).
38.  Carnap did not articulate this definition except in an informal style (1928, §71). 
We are indebted to later researchers for this definition (Leitgeb 2007, p.214, 
Kleinknecht 1980, p.24, Goodman 1951, p.121). 
39.  Instead of “ähnli,” we can use “Sim‘Aei” (Carnap 1928, §111).
40.  “Teilähnlichkeit” (Carnap 1928, §77). 
41.  As Goodman suggested (1951, pp.132－133), in this definition, Carnap is said to 
have withdrawn his doctrine on the temporal order of Er (cf. §5). But now it does 
not matter since we have already discarded that doctrine (§6).
42.  But this definition is exclusively concerned with the preceding figure (=(12)). So 
Carnap did not state it.
43.  “Wesentliche Überdeckungen” (Carnap 1928, §80).
44.  We owe the following argument to Goodman (1951, pp.135－136).
45.  See the first proviso of Goodman’s (1951, p.135).
46.  See the second proviso of Goodman’s (1951, p.135).
47.  “Eine zufällige Überdeckung” (Carnap 1928, §80).
48.  “|Ƚ|” stands for Ƚ’s cardinality.
49.  This is originally used for the class of all quality classes (Carnap 1928, §112).
50.  We can obtain our formulation of (19) from Carnap’s original (1928, §114) by ref-
erence to Principia (Whitehead&Russel 1910, p.278).
51.  In Carnap’s terminology, “die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Qualitäten” (1928, §114).
52.  This was stated only in an informal style (Carnap 1928, §88, Goodman 1951, 
p.140).
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53.  See (12). “t” stands for time, “c” for a color, and “p” for a place. Strictly speak-
ing, x must be <t1, <c1, p1>,…> to make it general. But in the present discus-
sion, we omit “…” for simplicity.
54.  Carnap provided this definition as the constitution of the sense class (die Sin-
nesklasse) symbolized as “Aeq‘Aqpo” (1928, §115).
55.  The relation which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive (cf. Enderton 1962, 
p.56). As for the power relation, see (8) above.
56.  Here, we step up from a class (qual) to a class of classes (qual/Aqpo). This is 
nothing but constitution (Carnap 1928, §40).
57.  In detail, see Enderton’s explanation (1962, p.57), for example.
58.  In detail, see Enderton’s explanation (1962, p.57), for example.
59.  “Ƚ1” is replaceable with other members, e.g., “Ƚ3.”
60.  This is not stated by Carnap directly (1928, §88). See also Goodman’s commen-
tary (1951, p.140).
61.  “zugleich” (Carnap 1928, §88).
62.  Here, we can realize what kind of experience Carnap had in mind.
63.  In Carnap’s notation, ȽiFreȽj ←→def. ȽiIȽj ש ȽiFrȽj (1928, §97, §117).
64.  In Carnap’s notation, “׌Ƚi(ȽiאP)” was “׌!P.” But this does not stand for the 
unique existence (cf. Canrap 1928, §97, Whitehead&Russel 1910, p.229).
65.  These are supposed to be experienced within a short length of time (cf. note62).
66.  ׫{a}=a (Enderton 1962, p.25).
67.  Recall the calculation of the relative complement (Enderton 1962, p.27).
68.  “Sehfeldstelle” (Carnap 1928, §88, §117).
69.  Recall the famous argument in Prolegomena as well (Kant 1783, §13).
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